Preliminary research
Agentic Browsers and the Same-Origin Policy
AI-collected research leads through 6 October 2026, including bounded month-by-month reviews of selected social and community sources from January through September. Unranked, incomplete, not community-vetted, and subject to change.
Across seven agentic browsers, the embedded agent can read page content that the same-origin policy would deny to script, including cross-origin iframes and masked password fields. A malicious page that frames a sensitive site and hides an instruction in its text can therefore have the agent summarise the framed content into an auto-submitting form, reducing the same-origin policy to the agent's prompt-injection defences; demonstrated end to end on ChatGPT Atlas Agent Mode.
Record
- Researcher
- Franziska Roesner and David Kohlbrenner
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This page is the archive's own catalogue record. The research is the work of Franziska Roesner and David Kohlbrenner, first published at the original source. Preserved copies are kept so the citation survives its host.