Preliminary research
Trusted Publishing, Untrusted Branch: Inside the Red Hat npm Compromise
AI-collected research leads through 6 October 2026, including bounded month-by-month reviews of selected social and community sources from January through September. Unranked, incomplete, not community-vetted, and subject to change.
Reconstructs an npm compromise in which ephemeral branches retained a trusted workflow filename and published through OIDC. Event actors and signed attestations reveal the branch that produced each package, distinguishing verified workflow identity from authorization to release and showing why deleted branches complicate incident reconstruction.
Record
- Researcher
- François Proulx
- Published by
- Boost Security Labs
In the archive
Tags
This page is the archive's own catalogue record. The research is the work of François Proulx, first published at the original source. Preserved copies are kept so the citation survives its host.