Later archive addition

Securing Frame Communication in Browsers (postMessage target-origin security)

Adam Barth, Collin Jackson and John C. Mitchell

Shows permissive and window frame-navigation policies allow cross-window and gadget-hijacking attacks (Google AdSense login, iGoogle), and gets the descendant policy shipped in Firefox 3 and Safari. Then breaks both inter-frame channels: fragment-identifier messaging in Microsoft.Live.Channels and SMash falls to a Needham-Schroeder/Lowe impersonation, and postMessage leaks messages to a frame navigated away first — fixed by targetOrigin.

Record

Researcher

Adam Barth, Collin Jackson and John C. Mitchell

In the archive

• Added to the 2008 archive after the original list was published

Tags

• iframe
• same-origin-policy
• sop-bypass
• postmessage
• formal-analysis
• mitigation
• phishing
• owasp-a01-2021
• owasp-a04-2021

This page is the archive's own catalogue record. The research is the work of Adam Barth, Collin Jackson and John C. Mitchell, first published at the original source. Preserved copies are kept so the citation survives its host.