Later archive addition

Targeted Deanonymization via the Cache Side Channel

Mojtaba Zaheri, Yossi Oren and Reza Curtmola

Targeted deanonymization that tells a malicious page whether its visitor holds a given public identifier such as an email address or a Twitter handle. It reads the CPU cache side channel rather than a cross-site leak, so cross-origin resource and opener policies and SameSite cookies do not stop it; it also works against Tor Browser.

Record

Researcher

Mojtaba Zaheri, Yossi Oren and Reza Curtmola

In the archive

• Added to the 2022 archive after the original list was published

Related sources

• Talk recording

Tags

• side-channel
• xsleak
• info-leak
• sop-bypass
• cookie
• browser-extension
• defence
• owasp-a01-2021
• owasp-a07-2021

This page is the archive's own catalogue record. The research is the work of Mojtaba Zaheri, Yossi Oren and Reza Curtmola, first published at the original source. Preserved copies are kept so the citation survives its host.